DARKReading/Alharbiについて、ここに記述してください。

https://twitter.com/securityflower/status/1095191066020466688

Collaborative Client-Side DNS Cache PoisoningAttackFatemah Alharbi∗†, Jie Chang‡, Yuchen Zhou§, Feng Qian¶, Zhiyun Qian∗, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh

∗∗Computer Science Department,University of California 
Riverside{falha08@,zhiyunq@cs.,nael@cs.}ucr.edu†Taibah University,Yanbu, Saudi Arabiafmhharbi@taibahu.edu.sa‡LinkSure Network,Chinachangjie@wifi.com§Information Assurance DepartmentNortheastern Universityzhou.yuc@husky.neu.edu¶Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of Minnesota – Twin Cityfengqian@umn.edu


Abstract— DNS poisoning attacks inject malicious entries intothe  DNS  resolution  system, 
 allowing  an  attacker  to  redirectclients to malicious servers.
 These attacks typically target a DNSresolver allowing attackers to poison a DNS entry for all machinesthat use the compromised resolver.
 However, recent defenses can effectively  protect  resolvers  rendering  classical  DNS  poisoningattacks ineffective.

 In this paper, we present a new class of DNSpoisoning attacks targeting the client-side DNS cache. 
The attack initiates DNS poisoning on the client cache, which is used in all main  stream  operating  systems  to  improve  DNS  performance,circumventing defenses targeting resolvers.

Our attack allows an off-path  attacker  to  collaborate  with  a  piece  of  an  unprivilegedmalware to poison the OS-wide DNS cache on a client machine.
We  developed  the  attack  on  Windows,  Mac  OS,  and  UbuntuLinux. Interestingly, the behaviors of the three operating systemsare distinct and the vulnerabilities require different strategies toexploit.
  We  also  generalize  the  attack  to  work  even  when  theclient is behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) router. Our results show that we can reliably inject malicious DNS mappings,with on average, an order of tens of seconds.
  Finally, we proposea  defense  against  this  type  of  poisoning attacks.